This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement in increasing the environmental and safety performance of U.S. natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The analysis combines data on federal regulatory inspections, enforcement actions, and penalties with data on injuries, fatalities, property damage, and barrels of product lost through pipeline "incidents" for 2006-2011 for the 344 largest pipeline operators in the U.S. The results of the analysis do not provide compelling evidence that either federal inspections or civil penalties are particularly effective in increasing performance; however, the number of federal cases initiated against an operator does have a significant effect on many forms of performance, although not for incidents in general. The results also suggest that some targeting of federal enforcement resources is based on past performance, but there may be room for even more effective targeting. Finally, the analysis reveals interesting patterns between state and federal enforcement efforts. 
Introduction
Over the past several years, the role that oil and natural gas pipelines might play in increasing the U.S.'s energy independence has gained significant attention. In particular, TransCanada's proposed Keystone XL Pipeline has been the subject of heated debate between those that believe the project is a critical part of the U.S.'s energy security strategy and will have a positive effect on the country's economy and those that believe the project imposes unacceptable risks for the natural environment including devastating sensitive environments and polluting important water sources. A number of relatively recent events have reinforced the arguments that pipelines pose serious threats to human health and the environment: in September of 2010 a natural gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno, California resulted in a massive fire that killed eight people, injured dozens of others, and destroyed over 100 homes and in July of 2011 an Exxon Mobil pipeline rupture spilled over 1,000 barrels of oil into the scenic Yellowstone River.
In late 2011, the U.S. Congress approved and President Obama signed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act to improve the performance of pipelines.
The act was passed during the 112 th Congress, one of the least productive -if not the least productive -legislative session in recent history [1] . The act drew unanimous support from both parties in part because of public outcry over the San Bruno explosion and the Yellowstone River spill. However, the act was a compromise and did not include all of the recommended policy changes that were proposed by the National Transportation Safety Board for increasing pipeline safety [2] . The main provisions of the act are an increase in funding for federal inspections of pipelines (the "Job Creation" part of the act) as well as an increase in the fines associated with violations of pipeline regulations. In accordance with the act, the administration's 2013 fiscal year budget increased funding for the Pipeline and Hazardous Safety Materials Administration by 60 percent and added 120 new federal inspectors.
While numerous studies have assessed the effectiveness of federal enforcement in improving compliance with general environmental regulations, to my knowledge there has never been a systematic evaluation of the effect of federal enforcement efforts on pipeline performance. Thus it is not clear whether the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act will actually accomplish its stated goal of increasing pipeline performance. In particular, because the act was prompted by public pressure to do something about pipeline performance, as May [3] points out, the compromise solution may not fully address the underlying regulatory failure. The goal of this paper is to provide the first empirical analysis of the effect that federal pipeline enforcement on pipeline performance.
The results of this analysis should provide insight into whether the changes mandated under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act are likely to achieve their goal of improving pipeline safety.
2.
Background on the Pipeline Industry Many liquid products are most cost-effectively transported via pipelines. However, many of the products transported by pipeline can pose significant threats to human health and the environment if leaked or released from the pipeline. Although pipelines are designed and constructed to maintain structural integrity since the transported materials have intrinsic value (unlike many effluent substances, such as hazardous wastes or byproducts), many factors make it difficult to avoid leaks and other releases during a pipeline's lifetime. Natural disasters, such as flooding, earthquakes, and storms, can result in pipeline failures, as can accidental human, machine, and animal intrusions. Additionally, pipelines may develop leaks or ruptures due to corrosion from the materials being transported or material fatigue from fluctuating temperature and pressure conditions.
In the U.S. over 2.5 million miles of pipelines transport natural gas, petroleum products and other hazardous liquids. Overall, pipelines are a relatively safe mode of transportation compared to alternatives such as tankers and rail cars, and the pipeline transmission safety record has improved significantly over time. However, more than 100 significant pipeline releases occur each year, and deaths from pipeline accidents are, unfortunately, not rare occurrences.
Prior to 1968, pipelines were not subject to safety or environmental regulations. In OPS was generally seen as ineffectual, with weak enforcement and ineffective rules [4] . In 2002, Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, which increased penalties and enforcement authority, and limited OPS discretion.
OPS sets the federal standards with which all pipeline operators must comply. As is true with many other regulations, states can and do pass supplemental regulations.
Additionally, pipelines in "high consequence" areas are subject to a stricter set of controls due to the increased risk for damage to human health or the environment. To complement formal enforcement, regulated pipelines must also self-inspect and report any violations discovered during the course of required inspections.
OPS is a relatively small agency. In 2011 prior to the passage of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act, there were under 120 inspectors working for OPS out of five regional offices (Trenton, NJ; Atlanta, GA; Kansas City, MO; Houston, TX; and Denver, CO) [5] . An additional 300 state inspectors carry out the majority of pipeline inspections. Standard inspections are designed to ensure that operation and maintenance procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, damage prevention and public education procedures, and pipeline installation, connection, repair, and operations are in compliance with the relevant regulations. Construction inspections include a review of material and component design specifications, welding procedures and welder qualifications, corrosion protection, and installation as well as post-construction testing.
Integrity management inspections are designed to determine whether an operator uses all available information about its pipeline system to assess risks and takes appropriate action to mitigate those risks.
OPS can initiate an enforcement case when an inspection identifies a violation of pipeline regulations or in response to an accident. The type of enforcement action taken depends on the significance of the violation. Minor problems occurring for the first time may only receive a warning letter, while more significant violations may require a compliance order that specifies actions the operator must take to come into compliance (e.g., requiring operators to replace pipeline sections or implement corrosion control and remediation strategies) or a civil penalty. Civil penalties are generally reserved for serious violations leading to deaths, injuries, or significant environmental damage. Regulators may impose civil penalties as severe as $100,000 for each day a violation existed, up to a maximum of $1,000,000. Since 2008, OPS has proposed over $21 million in civil penalties [6] . penalties. During the same time period state regulators logged almost 38,000 inspection days, discovered almost 14,000 violations, initiated over 4,000 enforcement actions, and assessed over $13 million dollars in penalties.
Related Literature
The objective of this paper is to better understand the role that federal inspections and enforcement actions play in increasing pipeline performance and compliance. while some theoretical models focus on a particular motive underlying the compliance decision, in practice the compliance decision is likely to depend on a number of different objectives and factors that differ across facilities.
According to Gray and Shimshack [10] , most policy-makers and scholars believe that an enforcement regime of inspections and sanctions is generally effective at increasing compliance with environmental regulations, and most regulated entities cite rigorous monitoring and enforcement as a primary motivator of their environmental compliance decisions. A number of empirical analyses confirm these beliefs. For example, Gray and
Deily [11] and Gray and Shadbegian [12] examine air pollution compliance for steel mills and pulp and paper mills in the U.S., respectively, and find that both inspections and enforcement actions have a statistically significant positive impact on compliance. Looking at compliance with U.S. water regulations, Earnhart [13] and Glicksman and Earnhart [14] similarly find that inspections and sanctions deter violations and reduce emissions at water treatment plants and chemical facilities, respectively. Stafford [15] shows that compliance inspections and penalties for violations have a significant deterrent effect on violations at facilities subject to hazardous waste regulations. 2 These results from the environmental compliance literature echo findings in other regulatory areas. In particular, a number of papers examine the deterrent effect of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections and sanctions on workplace injuries. Many of these papers find that inspections and sanctions do deter injuries, although the effects of deterrence depend significantly on the characteristics of the regulated entity being inspected or sanctioned and whether the inspection results in a sanction [16, 17, 18] . The goal of this paper is to add evidence from another closely related regulatory sector, pipelines, on the deterrent effect of federal inspections and enforcement actions in increasing compliance and performance.
Framework for the Analysis and Description of the Data
While pipelines are fixed structures, they are not constrained within a particular geographic area like most entities subject to environmental and safety regulations. While many pipeline are relatively short, there are also operators that have thousands of miles of pipeline crossing numerous state borders. Federal and state regulators do divide pipelines into 'inspection units'. For operators with short pipelines, the entire company may constitute one inspection unit while larger operators may be divided based on operating areas (e.g., cities or metropolitan areas) or company organization (e.g., all elements reporting to a single vice president). Unfortunately, data on pipeline performance and enforcement is not available at the inspection-unit level. Thus this analysis focuses on the aggregate performance of individual pipeline operators, rather than the performance of a particular section of a pipeline. This analysis is most analogous to firm-level studies of compliance and environmental performance, such as Khanna and Anton [19] and Thornton,
Gunningham, and Kagan [20] , although it is based on data reported to the federal government rather than data collected through a voluntary survey. Table 1 presents a summary of the performance measures for 2010 for the operators in this study. First, note that for all of these measures, the majority of operators have nothing to report. The most widely reported measure is property damage, followed closely by incidents. Property damage is reported more often than incidents because events that cause less than $50,000 in property damage are not considered incidents if they do not also result in fatalities, significant injuries, or sufficient loss of material. Given the relatively small number of operators that report in a given year, I aggregate performance data for 2009 and 2010 to increase the number of operators reporting. The mean and standard deviations for the aggregated data are presented in Table 2 which includes summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Note that the summary statistics are for all operators in the study, not just those reporting.
One of the principal challenges that can arise when trying to estimate the effectiveness of inspections and enforcement on performance is that of endogeneity or reverse causality, which can occur if there are omitted explanatory variables or the compliance and enforcement decisions are made simultaneously. With respect to the omitted variables concern, due to data limitations the analysis may not include some factors that affect both the operator's environmental performance as well as the regulator's decision to conduct inspections. For example, significant flooding in an area may cause pipelines to rupture, but might also bring increased inspections to that area. With respect to the simultaneity concern, contemporaneous inspections may be endogenous to the number of incidents reported if inspections serve as a significant mechanism through which incidents are discovered or reported. Similarly, the number of enforcement cases and amount of proposed penalties in a particular period are likely to depend on the number of incidents and fatalities that occur in that same time period. To address this concern I lag the enforcement variables, which may be endogenous, and I also include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. Ideally I would also use an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity, but due to the limited information available about pipeline inspections and enforcement, I have not been able to find any valid instruments to use for such an approach.
The first set of explanatory variables presented in Table 2  Gas Gathering lines collect and move natural gas from wells or offshore vessels to storage or processing facilities.
 Gas Transmission lines transport natural gas from gathering lines or storage facilities to distribution centers, storage facilities, power plants, and industrial customers and municipalities. These are generally the longest type of gas lines and are usually underground.
 Gas Distribution lines move natural gas to industrial customers and residences and are usually located in underground utility easements along streets.
 Hazardous Liquid lines transport petroleum products and other hazardous liquids, usually over long distances and underground. The remaining results in Table 3 provide some insight into why federal enforcement may not be particularly effective at decreasing poor environmental performance. First, observe that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in each regression (listed as Dependent Variable [6] [7] [8] ) is positive and significant for four of the regressions. Thus, for overall incidents, injuries, gross barrels spilled, and net barrels lost, there is considerable persistence across time -particularly when one recalls the difference in time frames across the two variables (three years to two years). The less predictable nature of fatalities and 5 One might be concerned that due to the self-reported nature of the data, some incidents are systematically going unreported in way that biases the findings of this study. Appendix A presents the results of a sensitivity analysis that suggests that under-reporting cannot explain the lack of significant negative coefficients on federal inspections.
Results and Policy Implications
property damage makes intuitive sense and is consistent with the Sosa and AlvarezRamirez [7] finding that more severe incidents are unpredictable. While very few of the remaining explanatory variables have a consistent effect on the performance variables, note that Gas Gathering has a significant and positive coefficient in the Fatalities, Injuries, and Property Damage regressions. Comparing the size of the three significant Gas Gathering coefficients to the mean and standard deviation for the three performance measures, note that operating a gas gathering pipeline is quantitatively a very important determinant for fatalities, injuries and property damage and may help explain why federal and state level enforcement actions are not more important deterrents for at least these types of non-performance.
Although lagging the federal enforcement variables and conditioning on prior values of the dependent variables should help to identify and estimate causal effects, as discussed in section 4 one might still be concerned that these results could be due to endogeneity. In similar situations other researchers have employed an instrumental variables approach to try to control for potential endogeneity, but given the limited information available about pipeline inspections and enforcement, I have not been able to find valid instruments for such an approach. As an alternative, I use Manski's partial identification approach [21, 22] to estimate plausible bounds for the causal effects of federal enforcement. As discussed in To provide additional insight into the mixed results presented in Table 3 , I also analyzed federal inspections and enforcement as a function of past performance. suggests that federal regulators may take into account state actions and hold off on their own enforcement actions against operators that have been subject to state actions in the recent past. However, the positive and significant coefficient on State Penalties Assessed [6] [7] [8] in the Federal Cases regression is inconsistent with such an interpretation.
Looking next at the operator characteristics variables, as expected longer pipelines face more inspections than shorter pipelines, although they are not subject to more federal cases or higher federal penalties. This finding makes sense, as inspections should depend on the potential for harm, while enforcement actions should depend on the presence of actual harm or violations. The insignificant coefficients on all of the regional dummies indicate there are not significant differences in the number of inspections based on the regions through which a pipeline runs. However, there are significant differences in the number of federal cases and penalties proposed by region, even after controlling for performance. While there are many possible explanations for these findings, they are consistent with regulators in different regions having different opinions about when cases should be initiated and how penalties should be set. Interestingly, even though the regressions in Table 3 suggest that pipeline performance depends on the type of pipelineGas Gathering, Gas Distribution, etc. -there is no variation in federal enforcement across the different types of pipelines.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to provide insight into the role that federal inspections, 
Appendix A: Sensitivity Analysis for Self-Reported Performance Data
If non-performance is systematically under-reported by operators that are not subject to federal enforcement, the results in Table 3 would be biased upward. To investigate whether under-reporting could provide an explanation for the positive and/or insignificant coefficients on the federal enforcement variables in the regressions presented in Table 3 , I conducted the following experiment to see how badly under-reported the performance data would have to be to estimate negative and significant coefficients for the federal enforcement measures.
The experiment is based on the conjecture that operators accurately self-report if they are or have recently been inspected but may choose to under-report if they are not inspected regularly. Since the performance data used in the Table 3 Table A1 the mean value of all of the performance measures except Injuries 09-10 is less for the non-inspected group than for the inspected group, and all of the differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.
For those operators that were not inspected by the OPS during 2009-2010, I
constructed "adjusted" performance variables where the adjusted variable is equal to the self-reported performance variable plus one standard deviation (calculated over the entire sample of 344 operators). For operators that were inspected by OPS, the adjusted variable is equal to the self-reported performance variable. I then ran the Table 3 regressions using the adjusted performance measures. Table A2 shows the coefficients and standard errors for the three federal enforcement variables for these adjusted regressions. Note that these results do not change the overall conclusions from As a first step, in estimating the ATE, I assume that the potential performance rates for both treated and untreated operators lie within the support observed in the data on performance from 2006 to 2010. Under this assumption the maximum possible negative treatment effect (i.e., improvement in performance) would occur when an operator's untreated performance would be equal to the maximum value and that same operator's treated performance would be equal to 0. 6 The maximum possible positive treatment effect would occur when an operator's untreated performance would be equal to 0 and that same operator's treated performance would be equal to the maximum value. Let M be the maximum observed performance level. Then
As shown in Table B1 , using the historical maximum values for each of the six performance variables provides initial bounds on the possible treatment effect, although by construction these bounds are relatively large as well as symmetric.
The next step in the partial identification approach is to further refine the bounds using the relatively weak assumption that the mean observed performance data for the As shown in Table B1 , this relatively weak assumption substantially shrinks the bounds of the ATE. 7 Given the concern that treatment selection may be endogenous, we can further shrink the bounds by making another weak assumption: that the average performance for treated firms is weakly higher than the average performance for untreated firms both with Table B1 the bounds on the ATE for Mean Fatalities [9] [10] and Mean Injuries 09-10 rule out any quantitatively significant positive effects while the bounds on the ATE for the remaining performance variables do allow for quantitatively significant positive effects. Comparing these results to the sign and significance of the coefficients in Table 3 , partial identification suggests that all of the positive coefficients on the federal enforcement variables in the Incidents, Property Damage, Gross Barrels Spilled, and Net Barrels Lost regressions are plausible even if one assumes that regulators do target operators with higher levels of non- 7 Manski calls this the "No Assumptions" bound. 8 Manski terms this the "Monotone Treatment Selection" assumption.
performance for enforcement actions. 9 However significant positive coefficients on the federal enforcement variables for the Fatalities and Injuries regressions would not be consistent with that assumption. Interestingly, I do not find any positive and significant coefficients for the federal enforcement variables in either the Fatalities or the Injuries regressions.
